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RFID technology emerged as the promising technology for its ease of use and implementation
in the ubiquitous computing world. RFID is deployed widely in various applications that use
automatic identification and processing for information retrieval. The primary components of
an RFID system are the RFID tag (active and passive), the reader and the back-end server
(database). Cost is the main factor that drove RFID tags to its immense utilization in which
passive tags dominate in today’s widely deployed RFID practice. Passive tags are low cost
RFID tags conjoined to several consumer products (like clothes, smart cards and devices,
courier, container, etc) for the purpose of unique identification. Readers on the other hand
act as a source to track and record the passive RFID tag’s activities (like modifications,
updates and authentication). Due to the rapid growth of RFID practice in the past few years,
measures for consumer privacy and security has been researched. The uncertainties that
arise with the passive RFID tags are handling of user’s private information (like name, ID,
house address, credit card number, health statement, etc) which are posed to considerable
threat from the adversary. Passive tags are inexpensive and contain less overhead and are
considered good performers and consequently lack in providing security and privacy.
Lightweight cryptography is an area of cryptography developed for low cost resourced
environment. Mutual authentication is defined as the process of verifying an authorized tag
and a reader (reader and server respectively) by an agreed algorithm to mutually prove
their legitimacy with each other. Adversary is a third party who tries to hear the ongoing
communication between the tag and the reader (reader and server respectively) anonymously.
In this thesis, symmetric lightweight ciphers like Present and Grain are introduced as mutual
authentication protocols to rescue the privacy aspects and properties of the RFID tags.
These ciphers are simple, faster and suitable to implement within the passive RFID network
and reasonably lay a foundation for the preservation of privacy and security of the RFID
system. Lightweight ciphers use hash functions, pseudo random generators, SP networks and
linear feedback shift registers to randomize data while mutual authentication scheme uses
lightweight ciphers to manage authorize the legitimacy of every device in the RFID network.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Smart cards and devices play an enormous role in our day to day life. Even
though these devices are not readily attached to us, we often come into
contact with them (tags, readers and servers) in our daily life unknowingly
(e.g. ATM money withdrawal, credit card payments, local transportation
service, toll systems, speed ticket systems, etc.). Smart cards act as secure
carriers, encrypting and computational devices. RFID tags are available as
smart cards, java cards and dotnet cards in serving various consumers near
toll systems, payment systems, identification systems and tracking systems for
a safer and convenient communication. Java cards and dotnet cards are used
mostly as vicinity cards by several firms. These tag (cards or labels) carry
information about user’s profile data, bank transactions and their personal
information and have the ability to store the past traces of the user and can
be retrieved later when commanded by a reader or the server. Some of the
applications using smart cards include users gym and cosmetic payments,
oﬄine transactions, online transactions which draws attention concerning
their security and privacy issues. These smart cards hold threats to famous
people. Queries and feedback of various users perspectives are drawn and
evaluated which concluded the uncertainties that exist in using the RFID
technology. Cryptographic techniques have been implemented in the RFID
systems for safeguarding the information while processing and transferring
them. Immense research had been undergone in the field of lightweight
cryptography which is developed to support the security of the smart devices
like RFID tags, sensor devices, etc. RFID technology has been in play
since 1950’s while it rapidly grew and gained attention in the mid 1990’s.
The commercial use of RFID worldwide started with theft detection and
anti-counterfeiting technology called European Article Surveillance (EAS) in
the shopping malls. Later the technology turned to provide different services
like access control in parking lots, inventory supply chain management and
toll systems by issuing tokens (RFID tags) and querying the tokens by the
authorized to retrieve the required information, with the help of the readers.
Cryptography has been a major tool serving security issues since decades
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but cryptography in the form of lightweight cryptography is a rescue tool for
constrained devices like RFID tags.
1.2 Problem Statement
Due to the reduction of the costs and ease of implementation of the RFID
tags caused it’s rapid increase in the distribution from the supply chain
management to several other commercial applications. The sudden demand
or usage had created certain insecurities and privacy issues that are to
be absolved. Adversaries have the opportunity to collect and track one’s
information from his RFID tag. Adversaries are third persons who try to
capture private information without prior permission. This enables the
eavesdropper to promote the personal identity information of an user by
executing an illegal activity. The most important entities that maintain user
privacy are user data and location. Forward and Backward privacy are two
forms of privacy that hold user’s privacy by measuring the eavesdroppers
capabilities to a certain extent. It is said that if a system supposedly achieves
forward and backward privacy in the trial of an user’s privacy is notably
considered as almost achieved privacy in that particular system. Forward and
Backward privacy can be easily broken if any of the illegitimate tags or readers
participate in the unauthorized communication process. Cryptography plays
an important role in transforming information allowing a limited possibility
for an eavesdropper to gain any portion of the exchangeable information
during his interaction between devices through the various possible channels.
Lightweight cryptography is one of the area of cryptography which utilize the
cryptographic algorithms that are primarily dedicated to the low cost devices.
The primary measures that are considered in developing new cryptographic
ciphers are gate equivalence (GE), chip size, number of registers, time
measurement for delay-response, power consumption, computation power,
etc. Since RFID tags need lightweight resources and faster techniques
in implementation, maintaining privacy and security in the system is a
primary challenge. In this thesis, we present a method for authentication and
preservation of user privacy by using various lightweight symmetric ciphers.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
The thesis report is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces
the basic theme of the thesis, the problem statement and the thesis limitations.
The second and the third chapters introduce RFID technology and lightweight
cryptography in a structured and detailed manner. The last chapter present
the privacy and security issues of the contemporary RFID systems and how
the lightweight cryptographic primitives play a vital role in maintaining and
preserving the privacy of the end users. This thesis studies certain lightweight
symmetric ciphers which when used along with the authentication protocols
find better solutions for preserving privacy. This report presents an overall
idea about how the RFID system is maintained, their threats (privacy and
security issues) and the use of cryptography in maintaining these threat
prone low-resource devices (RFID devices) in reaching a goal of privacy
successiveness and user confidentiality.
1.4 Thesis Delimitation
The thesis is arranged in such a way to demonstrate the overall RFID system
in a cryptographic environment. The objective of the thesis is to present
a privacy preserving analysis by showing the least possible probability in
gaining information by an adversary. This thesis does not evaluate the
cryptanalysis of the lightweight stream ciphers as the ciphers are presumed
to be secure. Since the thesis is much concerned about the privacy preserving
aspects, the security aspects of the cryptographic ciphers are not explained.
There is a hypothesis to present the ability of the ciphers as ciphers are
believed to work and resist complications created by the adversary for those
issues considered in this thesis.
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2 Overview of RFID
2.1 History of RFID
The roots of the RFID show it’s use way back in the Second World War
in 1940 to differentiate the good from the bad warplanes. The first official
patent of RFID was released in 1973 in the United States received for a
working active RFID tag with a rewritable memory. The same year a patent
from a California entrepreneur was received for a passive RFID tag. The
first RFID test application was an automatic opening of a door when the
reader was brought near door where the tag was located. Later, RFID was
used by the US Agricultural department to maintain the dosage system of
the cows in the cattle farms. In 1960’s, a commercial RFID application
called Electronic article surveillance (EAS) was introduced to control thefts
in shopping centers. RFID research was started and funded by the US
defense government for proper surveillance of nuclear materials spread all
over. In 1970’s, the free flow toll systems were tested with the passive RFID
transponders which are implanted in the vehicles and read by the readers
located under the surface of the highway. Sooner, RFID technology grabbed
attention by various industrial sectors for its ease of use and performance.
In 1980’s, RFID was introduced in many mainstream applications. Some of
its applications include electronic toll systems worldwide, personal access
systems, animal tagging, and many other industrial applications. In 1990’s,
there was an emergence to develop open standards for RFID systems as
a security measure due of its wide deployment. Auto ID center was an
organization founded in 1999 by MIT university with a group of four other
universities to develop standards for RFID. The MIT Auto ID center’s main
aim was also to develop the electronic product code (EPC) as a global
identification system using RFID tags and to replace the conventional bar
code systems which use universal product code (UPC). Later in 2003, MIT
AutoID center was named Auto ID Labs which was run by the EPC Global
and the group of partners of the Auto ID labs. RFID was widely deployed
for solutions related to various applications used in schools to the US defense
department. There was an assumption that RFID will be deployed in all
service sectors in the near future.
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2.2 RFID today
Today RFID is everywhere. As RFID has been rapidly proliferating globally,
there is a need in obtaining legal and reliable solutions to the global privacy
and security issues [11]. At present, Americans are the highly sensitive
people towards these issues as they abundantly use RFID technology and the
Europeans on the other hand are towards accepting the RFID technology
quickly and the Asians are about to introduce the technology in many places
[11]. Hence, it adds a duty to the researchers and developers to act upon
the growing privacy issues and to develop better algorithms and techniques
that avoid major threats to the privacy of the daily consumers as well as the
retailers and the producers. In summary, today RFID technology is used in
Schools, Libraries, Hospitals, Agriculture, Infrastructure, Payment systems,
Identification systems, Detection systems and Alarms, Tracking devices and
Defense.
2.3 Fundamentals of RFID
RFID stands for radio frequency identification. The main components of
the RFID system are the tag, the reader and the back-end server. RFID
technology originated from the time of invention of the transmitter and the
receiver. The RFID system uses radio waves in transmitting and receiving
signals for the data communication. The basic advantage of RFID tags to
that of the conventional bar codes is that the former have read and write
capabilities and the information on the RFID tags can be modified, updated
and locked. RFID devices utilize less power for short range communications in
handling the data activity. RFID devices operate in three different frequency
bands namely low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF) and the ultra high
frequency (UHF). The low frequency bands range up to one meter which
use inductive coupling technique for the data transfer while the latter range
up to ten meters which use the back scattering technique. Some major
applications of RFID devices include Supply chain and retail management,
defense systems, health care systems, access control systems, transportation
systems and so on.
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Figure 1: An RFID system
2.3.1 Tags
Tag is the basic component of the RFID system. Tags are also called as the
transponders. Each tag contain an unique code and a limited memory to
store information. There are three types of tags defined according to the
power and range capabilities namely active, semipassive and passive tags.
Usually, passive tags have no power source and they retrieve the signal energy
from the reader while semi-passive and active tags have a battery source
to generate a signal by their own and can exchange information with the
reader. The main characteristics of a tag include singulation, anti tag collision
interference and its unique identity. A tag header contains three elements
namely a CRC, EPC and a password. Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is the
checksum of the tag to check if any errors occurred during data transmission
or storage. Electronic product code (EPC) is the unique serial number used
to identify the tag. Password is the block of data used for authenticating a
legitimate reader. RFID tags currently operate in three different frequency
bands namely low frequency module (LF), high frequency module (HF) and
ultra high frequency module (UHF). Generally, low frequency bands operate
in lower read range and data rates and high frequency bands operate in
higher read ranges and data rates. Each frequency band work on their own
mechanism and no one frequency band is ideal for all applications[2].
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Active tag Semi-active tag Passive tag
Power Source Yes Yes No
Storage Yes Yes No
Performance High High Low
Cost High High Low
Table 1: Types of tags
Low cost tags High cost tags
Power Source Passive Active
Storage 32 bytes - 1KB 32 - 70KB
Security 250 - 2000GE 3000 - 5000GE
Distance 3 meters 10 cm
Price 5 - 50cents several euros
Table 2: Tag specifications
2.3.2 Readers
Reader is the powerful component of the RFID system. Readers are also
called as the transceivers. Each reader has the capacity to encompass certain
number of tags within the read range. Reader can change, update and
modify the information in the tags by proving its legitimacy through an
authentication process. There are two types of readers namely simple and
complex readers. Simple readers are mostly used for verification in supply
chain management, tracking goods which require less computation. Complex
readers are meant for applications which needs computation and evaluation
of the legitimate RFID tags[2].
Low Frequency High Frequency Ultra High Frequency
Bandwidth 125-135 KHz 6 - 27 MHz 400 - 930 MHz
Range 1.0 meter 10 meters 100 meters and more
Table 3: Tag frequencies
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2.3.3 Back-end server
Back-end server or back-end database is the third key component of the RFID
system. Each server maintain a database which contain the information of
all the legitimate readers and tags. Back end servers are connected to the
readers directly or wireless to retrieve information and verify the tag. The
tag related information is processed by the server for authentication and the
approval is sent back to the reader for further transactions. The reader can
be queried by the server for the detailed information of the tags and the
reader respectively.
2.3.4 Data Communication
The communication in the RFID system can occur between the tag, the
reader and the server while it is initiated either by the reader or the server(in
case of passive tags). The tag and the reader communicate through insecure
channels (in most cases) where there is a possibility of eavesdropping while in
case of reader and server (when connected through wire) reduces the means
of eavesdropping. There are two channels that carry the information to both
the ends namely the forward channel and the backward channel in which the
former is responsible as the information barrier from the reader to the tag
while the latter is responsible for the exchange of information from the tag to
the reader. Digital and analog signaling techniques like Manchester encoding,
non-return-zero (NRZ), pulse position modulation (PPM), amplitude shift
keying (ASK), pulse shift keying (PSK) and frequency shift keying (FSK)
are used for encoding and modulating the communication signals while
transmission. RFID systems mostly use these techniques to detect any noise
(error) on the channel and prompt the reader to wait or delay the argument
process [1].
2.3.5 EPC and EPC Gen2 Standard
EPC is abbreviated as Electronic product code. It is considered as a standard
code for RFID tags. All the EPC codes are administered by the EPCglobal
standard system. EPC is a 96 bit string which is capable of identifying
16 million object classes producing 68 million serial numbers for each class
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serving for 268 companies all over the world. The EPC was soon being
extended to 128 bit for future applications. An EPC consists of four parts
namely EPC header, EPC manager number, EPC product number and a
unique serial number. The EPC header specifies the version number, format,
and the length (64, 96,128-bit) of the tag , the EPC manager refers to the
manufacturer identification number, the EPC product number refers to the
type of product and the EPC serial number refers to the unique identification
of the desired item. EPC was firstly created by the MIT Auto-ID center
organization and then licensed to EPCGlobal in October 2008.
EPC Gen2 standard was introduced to develop the second generation EPC
tags which are being used in today’s commercial applications where these
codes play a vital role in the unique identification of the smart devices. These
codes are assigned to low-cost tags that are used for smart applications with
limited resources and fast processing capabilities. The purpose behind the
enhancement was to utilize the first generation Class 1 tags for the second
generation smart device applications. The detailed information about the
tag classes is showed in the Table 2.4.
2.3.6 EPCglobal and ISO standards
EPCglobal is the universal standard for maintaining and improvising EPC
tags and products. It is formed in October 2008 replacing the MIT Auto-
ID center. EPCglobal is responsible for all the EPC enabled data sharing
worldwide. EPCglobal defines several classes of tags which embrace all the
types of tags discovered and applied so far [12]. ISO standards on the other
hand introduce certain policies and rules in maintaining and applying RFID
devices in different environments. Some of the general ISO standards are
listed in the Table 2.5.
2.4 Need for Cryptography
Many cryptographic techniques have been designed to overcome the problems
in using RFID technology. The main problems that are evident by using
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Tag classification Description
Class 0 Read only and passive Programmed by the manufacturer
Class 1
"Write once, read many" Programmed by customer
and passive not reprogrammable
Class 2
rewritable and passive Passive tag with 65KB
Gen2 rewritable memory, reprogrammable
Class 3
Semipassive, Gen2 Built-in battery with
increased range, reprogrammable
Class 4
Active, Gen2 Runs its own circuitry with
use of its battery, reprogrammable
Class 5
Active, Gen2 Communicates with all other
Class 5 tags, reprogrammable
Table 4: Classes of tags [12]
ISO standard number Description
ISO 11784/11785 RFID for animals
ISO 14443 Proximity and Vicinity cards, e.g credit cards.
ISO 15961/15963 Information technology and unique identification
ISO 18000 Interface communications, e.g Air, Frequency, etc
ISO 18185 Electronic seals in Foreign containers
ISO 15459 Unique identification in Transportation
Table 5: ISO standards for RFID tags
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RFID are providing security and privacy to the end users. The main aim of
using cryptography is to randomize the tag results over time when sending
it to the reader so as to prevent any privacy threats. Several solutions
have been designed to fit the lightweight crypto-algorithms in terms of
execution and low computation capabilities. Low cost tags ( passive RFID
tags) certainly cannot perform all the standard cryptographic operations
necessary to offer security due to the high overhead [16]. Hence, achieving a
considerable security and privacy in passive tags is an upcoming challenge.
Many researchers have come up with solutions that offer cryptography to
the low cost tags in which the foremost two techniques were proposed by
the MIT Auto-ID center and the RSA laboratories for the Eavesdropping
problem. Researcher’s from the MIT center proposed a technique called
silent tree walking in which the primary concern was that no reader can
broadcast tag’s information. The second technique was proposed by the RSA
laboratories by using pseudonyms where the tags carry multiple identifiers
each time and are completely random and can only be recognized by the
legitimate readers and not eavesdroppers [16]. At present, various lightweight
implementations are proposed to maintain privacy and security in the RFID
systems. Lightweight cryptography is defined as "As light as a feather,
and as hard as dragon-scales"[17]. It is also defined as ’lightweight" and
"cryptography" together leads to think about lack of security, but there exist
combinations that allow limited constrained devices to persist by achieving
performance and scalability while maintaining privacy and security[18].
2.5 RFID applications
RFID technology has been in use since World War II. Today RFID technology
is used almost everywhere. RFID technology is used by many firms in many
applications for improving their internal and external efficiency. In general,
most common applications that utilize RFID technology presently are:
Transportation
RFID technology is used in various local transport systems in different coun-
tries, like Switzerland, UK, Finland, etc; by issuing unique RFID tags to all
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its customers to provide access to distinct bus services. RFID tags are also
used to distinguish various foreign containers and automatically identify a
unique product among various products inside one container and to pop-up
a distinct categorized product among the whole.
Agriculture
Agriculture is the one of the first areas that used RFID technology. RFID tags
are used in recording movements of animals like cattle, pigs, etc. By using
the record information, modern farmers can monitor the health status of the
animals from time to time. The same concept can be used for ensuring correct
feed to specific category of animals by maintaining a database of information.
All the information related to each RFID tag (unique identification of ev-
ery animal) is stored in the central database and is updated from time to time.
Retail and Supply Management
RFID technology is a major advancement in the Retail and Supply man-
agement used in keep track of all the products from manufacturing to the
assembly phases and maintaining them. It is easy to monitor the movement
of the finished products throughout the inventory. RFID is also used to
evaluate and count the frequent hot selling products and the non-frequent
selling products in the inventory. This scheme possibly reduce the costs of
the working units and surveillance. RFID is also used in theft detection in
protecting the selling products from theft and counterfeiting. RFID is also
used in preserving brand protection in identifying the fake products (fake
tags).
Smart devices
RFID tags act as sim cards in smart phones which implicates that the smart
phone inturn acts as a RFID device. Smart phones act as readers in active
mode and tags in passive mode. RFID tags are used in credit cards and other
smart cards to uniquely verify a user to control accessibility under certain
limitations. RFID tags are also used in ePassports and National ID cards
in many countries. All these cards are implanted with RFID tags inside
and are used for identification and access controlling purposes in different
12
applications.
Navigation Systems and Defense
RFID devices are incorporated with GPS to provide more accurate infor-
mation to the mobile users by installing RFID tags (to store location and
other necessary information) in various parts of the roads. All the RFID tags
(tagged smart phones) refer to the readers (GPS systems) which provide the
users with accurate information to reach the destination. By using RFID
reader modules incorporated with GPS and gyroscope (device which rotates
for different dimensional views) together provide highly accurate information
to the end users. RFID is also used in PDA’s assisted with bluetooth and
Internet which provide audio information about the route to the destination
to the visually impaired persons. RFID is also used in defense to trace the
nuclear weapons (weapons installed with RFID tags) and to improvise the
management between the manufacturers and the suppliers.
Health Care Systems
RFID is used in the Health care management to eliminate drug counter-
feiting and theft control. It is also used for misuse of medications and
mis-identification of the drugs. RFID is used in patient tracking and medi-
cal assistance by tagging RFID tags to the patient. This process helps in
avoiding improper drug usage to the patient by advance installing the drug
information to the tag. The doctors can study the patient medical status
and profile by just reading the tag information. RFID is also used to identify
and count the drugs in the shelves by placing readers (installed with the
drug database) in the shelves.
Access Control
RFID is used in airport baggage management for maintaining the right in-
formation about the luggage of a specified airplane. RFID is used in various
toll road systems for automatic identification of vehicles by verifying the
RFID tags installed in the cars. RFID is used in door access systems by
installing RFID tags (in the form of plastic cards) permitted to different
access points. RFID is also used in parking lots to control traffic and display
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the vacant parking slots to the users. RFID provides real time security in
various applications.
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3 Lightweight Cryptography
Since traditional cryptography is not suitable for low constrained devices
like RFID devices and sensor (smart) devices, there was a need to develop
new cryptographic models that suits the environment of low constrained
devices. This type of cryptography is defined as lightweight cryptography.
Lightweight Cryptography is a part of modern cryptography developed for
low-constrained devices and is considered as a prominent state-of-art tech-
nique. Lightweight cryptography aims to utilize all the available limited
resources of the system (in terms of hardware and software) and provide
better efficiency and overall performance. Most of the factors that are con-
sidered while implementing lightweight cryptography are gate equivalence,
computational power of microprocessors, power consumption, random ac-
cess memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM) in terms of hardware
and key-size in terms of software. Other factors include the design of the
cryptographic algorithms, computational methods, lightweight cryptographic
tools and distinct RFID protocols. Cryptography is all about masking a
message using a key to produce a cipher and unmasking the cipher when
required using the same key to get the original message. This cipher uses
keys, random generators, logic gates, etc. to perform encoding and decoding
of the confidential information. Ciphers are of two types, namely symmetric
and public key ciphers. Symmetric ciphers are those which is use same key
for encoding and decoding the message while public key ciphers use different
keys at both the ends. There are several symmetric lightweight ciphers like
Present, Grain, etc; that are prominently used in today’s smart devices
(like RFID tags, sensor devices) to mask the signals using cryptography to
safeguard information from the third parties (adversaries).
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
Linear feedback shift register is a n-bit shift register that generates a periodic
sequence ranging from 0 to 2n-1. They are known to produce binary sequences
15
Figure 2: Linear feedback shift register
with good pseudo random properties, but probable to be predicted and hence
are mostly combined with a non-linear function. LFSR’s are used often to
construct stream ciphers and pseudo random number generators (PRNG).
For example: Consider 16-bit LFSR shown in Fig 4.1 whose polynomial
equation can be derived as X5 +X3 +X2 + 1. As the LFSR has 16 bits (0
≤ i ≤ 15) in which 0th, 3rd, 5th and 7th bits are selected for feedback and
the output register (Z15) of the 16-bit LFSR would be as follows:
Zi = (Zi−8 + Zi−10 + Zi−12 + Zi−15) mod 2 . . .
(1)
LFSR’s are easy to implement as it requires minimal hardware logic. There
are two types of linear feedback shift registers namely internal LFSR and
external LFSR. In external LFSR’s, the feedback to various XOR gates in
the circuit is fed from the output of the previous LFSR. In internal LFSR’s,
the feedback to various XOR gates are within the LFSR. LFSR’s are used in
the construction of counters, PRNG’s, etc.
3.1.2 Non-linear feedback shift register (NFSR)
NFSR is one of the prominent component in the construction of the modern
stream ciphers for RFID and smart devices. They can be viewed as the finite
state automata. Finite automata is a theory of state machines which accept
specific nature of strings or bits and produce strings of another state. They
are easy to implement and faster than the LFSR’s. The output sequence of
the NFSRs have good statistical properties and hard to predict. NFSRs have
been proposed as an alternative to the LFSRs for generating key streams for
stream ciphers. NFSRs are shift registers whose current state is a non-linear
function of the previous state. The output sequences of the NFSRs are hard
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Figure 3: Non-linear feedback shift register
to predict and are more resistant to the algebraic attacks. NFSRs can be
implemented in Fibonacci and Galois configurations. The last bit of the
state is considered as the feedback bit and the feedback can be applied to
every bit. Galois configured NFSRs are faster and hence became popular for
its use in many stream ciphers like Grain and Trivium (eStream ciphers).
3.1.3 SP and Feistal networks
A substitution-permutation network consists of a series of S-boxes and
P-boxes interconnected virtually to diffuse randomness of the input data.
Advanced encryption standard (AES) is designed using the SP network.
S-box (substitution box) is defined as a logical look-up table with a series of
mathematical operations processed linearly in order to retrieve the original
information. The inputs to the S-box are a series of bits of length say ’m’
which are transformed into a series of bits of a length say ’n’ which can
be retrieved back using a reverse operation. These inputs are again fed
into another S-box for a more strategic preservation of the primary input
information. P-box is defined as a permutation box which shuﬄes the given
set of bits across the inputs of S-boxes. In a SP network, S-boxes and
P-boxes are chained together as to create confusion and diffusion across
the various inputs and outputs in building a ciphertext. On the other
hand, Feistel networks are slight similar to the SP networks not only in the
implementation but in the design. Feistel networks use internal functions
called round functions which are iterated in schedule consisting of initial
vectors (IV) and the key schedule. Round functions play a major role in
iterating the sequence of instructions embedded as a procedure. Feistel
networks also use a procedure called sub-mixing which combines several
functions so as to create randomness in the whole feistel network. SP and
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feistel networks are constructed in terms of both hardware and software to
get the optimized implementation of the algorithm.
3.1.4 Pseudo Random Generators
A Pseudo random generator is an algorithm that accept a string of say ’m’
bits as input and produce an output string of say ’n’ random bits larger than
size of the input string, n>>m. Pseudo random generators are used in the
cryptographic encryption algorithms to provide randomization in the key
stream generation. Key generation is the fundamental process that injects
randomness to the entire process eventually. Hence PRNG’s are implemented
primarily for the key stream generation and authentication and encryption
schemes in the conventional and lightweight cryptography. Conventionally,
PRNG’s have two characteristics that they bound to, in which firstly is they
do not allow detection of any of the original (initial) inputs so as to prove its
randomness statistically. Secondly, PRNG’s does not allow any eavesdropper
to predict the next bit based on a given set of bits or probability. The latter
statement is assumed to be passed of a PRNG if and only if it passes the
former statement [24].
3.1.5 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash function is an algorithm that takes a binary string of some message of
any length as input and transforms into a fixed length output called a hash
value. A hash function is a function f :D→R , where the domain D = [0,1]*
consists of binary string of variable length and output R = [0,1]n consists of
binary string of fixed length. Hence f is a function which takes a message
M and transforms it into a hash value h of size n. Usually every hash func-
tion compresses a finite string into a much shorter fixed length output [15,26].
Properties of a hash function:
[i] A hash function f should accept a message of any size.
[ii] A hash function should produce a fixed length output.
[iii] Given any given message M, it should be easy to determine a hash value
h.
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[iv] Given a hash value h, it is computationally difficult to find M such that
H(M)= h.
[v] Given a message M1, it is computationally unfeasible to find another
message M2, with H(M1) 6= H(M2)
[vi] It is computationally unfeasible to find any pair of distinct messages
(M1, M2) such that H(M1) = H(M2).[41]
3.2 Symmetric Lightweight protocols
Symmetric encryption is the oldest and fastest methods of cryptography used
in today’s applications. Symmetric encryption uses a single secret key to
encrypt and decrypt the information. This methodology of using the same
secret key to retrieve the information is mostly used in private surround-
ings. Symmetric protocols are divided into stream and block ciphers which
are categorized based on their encryption mechanisms. Stream ciphers are
symmetric ciphers which encrypt the message bit by bit and the encryption
of each bit is related to it’s previous bit. They are fast in processing, but
consume much memory. Stream ciphers are further divided into synchronous
and self-synchronous ciphers. Synchronous ciphers are a type of symmetric
ciphers which tend to remain erroneous in case of transmission errors as
the key totally depends upon the previous sequences of the keystream. Self-
synchronous stream ciphers are self adjustable ciphers as the key is a sequence
of the previous plaintext and ciphertext. Block ciphers encrypt the message
as blocks of data in which each block is separately encrypted with a single
key. Stream ciphers and block ciphers are significant in their approaches and
applied in their places of interest. There are several lightweight stream and
block ciphers that are developed for applications presently used today. A
hybrid cipher called Humming bird-2 (mixture of block and stream cipher)
which is also developed for authentication of the low constrained devices.
Similarly, Grain being a stream cipher (belongs to e-stream family) is also
dedicated to deal with security and privacy preserving aspects while imple-
mented in low cost environments. In this section, a brief implementation and
working of two ciphers (Present and Grain) are presented. Various ciphers
have been developed for smart devices and their tools to improve security
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and privacy complexities. Some of the important cryptographic protocols
that are useful in authentication of RFID devices are explained in this section
and are compared to analyze the privacy aspects in the next chapter.
• Rekeying: Since symmetric ciphers use a shared key directly to crypto-
graphically process data, using it as a master key and deriving subkeys
and using those subkeys for processing is called re-keying. This process
is mostly used in block ciphers and is expected to bring good security
results.
3.2.1 A lightweight block cipher: PRESENT
PRESENT is a symmetric block cipher which can be implemented in both
software and hardware. It has moderate security levels and uses a 80 bit
keystream. PRESENT uses an extremely simple SP network, an 80-bit key
and 64-bit block size. It contains 16 S-boxes of dimensions 4x4 and uses
two rounds of simple bit permutations. The final cipher is then extracted
using 31 rounds of key scheduling. This cipher uses the smallest s-boxes
(4x4) in hardware implementations. The key is designed to eliminate the
symmetry in the process and to prevent side channel attacks. The main
intention in using S-box and permutation layers is to introduce non-linearity
and diffusion in the overall input process. Rekeying is not possible using
present cipher. The whole cipher is constructed using four functions namely
addroundkey, S-box layer, P-layer and key scheduling. The working of the
PRESENT cipher can be explained using a single stage called addroundkey
with 32 iterations and three sub-stages where the key and state are updated
and modified using S-box layer, P-layer and key scheduling[5].
Terms:
K: 80 bits , user supplied key
Ki: 64 bits, roundkey where 0≤i≤63 (leftmost 64 bits of K)
bj : 64 bits, block size where 0≤j≤63
wi: 16 (*4 bit) words where 0≤i≤15
S[wi]: current state in the S-box
P[i]: Position of every ith bit of S-box in the P-box.
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Addroundkey
Addroundkey is a key which is modified every round with the scheduled key
to produce the version of the current state. Given the user supplied key of
80 bits and the roundkey (initially the LSB 64 bits of the supplied key) is
64 bits, and a block of 64 bits, the acquired current state (64 bits) for each
round (0 to 31) can be expressed as in the equation 3.2.
bj = bj ⊕ Kij where 0 ≤ j ≤ 63
(2)
S-box layer
The s-boxes substitute the 64-bit current state as sixteen 4-bit words and
arrange them in rows and columns. After every round of arranging of s-boxes,
p-boxes take the ith bit in the 4x4 s-box array and arrange it in the position
P[i] in the box. In each S-box layer, the current state of 64 bits, b63 . . . .
b0 are conceived as sixteen 4-bit words.The 16 words are represented as w15 .
. . .w0 where each wi can be expressed as in the equation 3.3. The S-box
updates for each of the values of wi as S[wi] accordingly.
wi = b4∗i+3 || b4∗i+2 || b4∗i+1 || b4∗i where 0 ≤ i ≤ 15
(3)
P-box layer
In the permutation-layer, every ith bit of the state in the s-box is moved
to position P[i] in the p-box. We can say that the bits in the s-box array
are shuﬄed within the p-box of the same dimension of an s-box.. The main
aim of using the p-boxes is to diffuse the elements of the s-box in a certain
manner so that there exists confusion in understanding the pattern of the
arrangement. The p-boxes are always a key component in the construction
of an SP network.
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Key Scheduling
The main aim of this function is to update the key in each round of the total
32 rounds. The user supplied key being 80 bits (K : k79 . . . k0) in which
the leftmost 64 bits (Ki : k79 . . . k16) are conceived as the round key bits,
in each round of the Addroundkey stage. The 80 bits of the user key K is
updated in an unusual fashion for every round to maintain randomization.
The updation is as shown below:
At round i (0<i <31), the 64-bit round key is updated as in the equation 3.4.
k63. . . k0 = k79 . . . k16
(4)
After extracting the round key in every ith round, the 80-bit user key K is
updated as in the equation 3.5. The 80-bit original key is updated every
round using the equation 3.5. The updation takes place in three steps. The
updated key is always 80-bits. The round key is chosen by taking the leftmost
64 bits from the updated original key after every round. The current state
after every round is calculated using the equation 3.4. The current state is
updated every round using XOR operation. The current state at the 32nd
round is the ciphertext[5].
k79k78 . . .k0 = k18k17 . . . . k20k19
k79k78k77k76 = S[k79k78k77k76]
k19k18k17k16k15 = k19k18k17k16k15 ⊕ ith.round
(5)
The cipher is extracted after 32 rounds of the above process. Since it uses an
SP network for construction, the plaintext given by the user can be extracted
by using a reverse process using the addroundkey function. Present is a
new lightweight block cipher developed by the Orange labs in France, Ruhr
University Bochum (Germany) and the Technical University of Denmark.
The cipher was designed by eight people. It is one of the most compact
encryption methods ever designed and is 2.5 times smaller than Advanced
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Encryption Standard (AES). It is mostly focused on hardware implementa-
tions and suitable for situations where low power consumption and high chip
efficiency is desired. PRESENT is included as a new international standard
by International Organization for Standardization and the International
Electro-technical Commission [29,30].
3.2.2 A lightweight stream cipher: Grain
Grain is a lightweight stream cipher developed for constrained environments.
The cipher is simple in design for software implementation but complex to
construct in hardware. Considering AES (advanced encryption standard)
which being a successful stream cipher for many applications despite con-
suming large number of gates is not feasible to fit in the RFID environment.
RFID environment needs smaller and faster working ciphers. The primary
properties of lightweight cryptographic ciphers are gate area, speed, security
and simplicity. Every cipher has its own significance in terms of simplicity and
design where partial differences in hardware and software implementations
exist. The design of GRAIN [4] is based on two shift registers namely linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) and the non-linear feedback shift register
(NFSR). The advantage of using the LFSR is that it guarantees a minimal
period in using the key stream and producing a balanced output. On the
other hand, NFSR introduces a non-linearity to the cipher as the LFSR when
used solely is compromised to attacks. Many stream ciphers in history are
built on using linear feedback shift registers alone which is easy and simple
to build and to produce good statistical properties. Stream ciphers are bit
(process bit by bit) and word (process word by word) oriented.Word oriented
stream ciphers are complex to implement but produce better throughput.
Speed of the cipher depends upon the amount of the hardware. Grain is a
bit-oriented synchronous stream cipher. In synchronous cipher the keystream
is generated separately from the plaintext. The memory requirements for
implementing this protocol are LFSR as an 80 bit register, NFSR holds 80
bits, an 80-bit keystream and a 64-bit initialization vector (IV).
Terms:
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Figure 4: Grain Cipher
f(x): feedback function of LFSR
Si: state of LFSR (0< i<79)
g(x): feedback function of NFSR
bi: state of NFSR (0<i<79)
h(x): filter function of both LFSR and NFSR
Ki: Key bits( 0<i<63)
IVi: Initialization vector (0<i<79)
The construction of the cipher can be explained in two phases. In the
first phase, the cipher is initialized with the key and the IV bits and NFSR
is loaded with the key bits (bi = Ki). The first 64 bits of the 80-bit LFSR
are loaded with the 64 least significant bits of the initial vector IV and the
remaining bits are filled with one’s so as to avoid the zero state of an LFSR as
its working is not possible. The linear feedback register (LFSR) is fed by the
feedback polynomial f(x) and the cipher to generate the new state of LFSR.
The feedback polynomial f(x) is given in the equation 3.7. Similarly the
non-linear feedback register is fed by the feedback polynomial g(x) and the
cipher to get the new state of NFSR. The non-linear feedback polynomial is
given in the equation 3.8. The cipher is clocked 160 times without producing
any running keystream.
f(x) = 1 + x18 + x29 + x42 + x57 + x67 + x80
(6)
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g(x)= 1+x18++x20+x28+x35+x43+x47+x52+x59+x66+x71+x80+x17.x20+x43.x47
+x45.x71+x20.x28.x35+x47.x52 x59+x17.x35.x52.x71+x20.x28.x43.x47+x17.x20.x59.x15
+x17.x20.x28.x35.x43+x47.x52.x59.x65.x71+x28.x35.x43.x47.x52.x59
(7)
The filter function h(x) which uses five variables from LFSR and NFSR
together is again xored (masked) with the state of the NFSR to produce
the output (keystream). The output of the filter function is fed to both the
LFSR and NFSR using a XOR operation. The filter function is expressed as
in equation 3.8. The feedback polynomial of the linear feedback shift register
and the non-linear feedback shift register are shown in the equation 3.6 and
3.7. In the second phase, the updates are progressed in background in every
register. The update functions of the linear feedback shift register and the
non-linear feedback shift register are shown in the equation 3.9 and 3.10.
h(x)=x1+x4+x0x3+x2x3+x3x4+x0x1x2+x0x2x3+x0x2x4+x1x2x4+x2x3x4
(8)
Si+80 = Si+62 + Si+51 + Si+38 + Si+23 + Si+13 + Si
(9)
bi+80 = si + bi+62 + bi+60 + bi+52 + bi+45 + bi+37 + bi+33 + bi+28 + bi+21 +
bi+14 + bi+9 + bi + bi+63 bi+60 + bi+37 bi+33 + bi+15 bi+9 + bi+60 bi+52 bi+45
+bi+33 bi+28 bi+21 + bi+63 bi+45 bi+28 bi+9 + bi+60 bi+52 bi+37 bi+33 + bi+63
bi+60 bi+21 bi+15 + bi+63 bi+60 bi+52 bi+45 bi+37 + bi+33 bi+28 bi+21 bi+15 bi+9
+ bi+52 bi+45 bi+37 bi+33 bi+28 bi+21
(10)
Grain cipher is mostly suitable for hardware implementations. The security
requirements correspond to 280 complexity. Grain is implemented in a 160-bit
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memory. The period of the output functions depend upon all the functions
as input of the NFSR is masked with the output of the LFSR and then
the key and IV. The criteria behind the masking is in order to balance the
NFSR state. In the key initialization phase, both the contents are combined
and clocked 160 times in the filter function before producing the running
key which shows its randomness property. The last 16 bits of the LFSR are
not used in the feedback function or filter function as to use that space to
increase the speed by the hardware. Grain can be implemented at rates 1 bit
/clock cycle to 1 word/clock cycle, but preferred to be used at 1 bit/clock
cycle due to high focus on small hardware complexity [4].
3.2.3 Summary
In symmetric cryptography, there are two types of implementing lightweight
ciphers. The first one is picking a state of art technique like AES and building
a lightweight cipher based on its model. The second one is building a domain
ad-hoc specific new lightweight protocol. The absence of decryption is a
factor that can reduce the overall hardware of the cipher but cannot avoided
in many applications. Several domain specific ciphers EPCBC and PRint
are developed based on Present cipher which are used for electronic product
code (EPC) encryption applications. Stream ciphers are a type of symmetric
ciphers and are well suited for constrained devices. Despite their evolution
and efforts of concern, block ciphers are considered superior to them. Stream
ciphers are simple and speeder when in implemented in hardware but takes
lengthy initialization. Hash functions are another research filed of lightweight
cryptography. They contain too large hardware for constrained devices (i.e
more than 3000GE). After release of Present cipher, there are many efforts
to build lightweight hash functions. The advantages of hashes are efficiency
with low cost devices. Symmetric ciphers and hash functions are the latest
methods of ciphering devices for protecting privacy and security of systems
(esp. RFID devices).[31]
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4 Security and Privacy in RFID
RFID tags operate in an inherently insecure and noisy environment. This
type of communication environment calls for measures like security and
privacy. Security of a system is the ability to keep its information secure from
the adversary. The security of the RFID system wholly depends upon the
software and hardware implementation used in the system. Common security
attacks and problems of RFID networks are physical attacks, forward security,
backward security, passive and active eavesdropping. Privacy of a system
is the ability of the RFID system to keep the meaning of the information
secure from the adversary. Privacy of the system wholly depends upon the
mechanism of the data preservation while authenticating the legitimate tags
and readers. Some of the common properties to maintain privacy in the
system are backward untraceability, forward untraceability, tag anonymity,
tag indistinguishability and tag unlinkability. Other attacks related to
privacy and security are denial of service (DoS) attack, tag impersonation
attack, server impersonation attack, man in the middle attack and the replay
attack[9,14].
4.1 Privacy properties
Tag anonymity
Tag anonymity is a property which guarantees to secure users identity infor-
mation from any adversary. A tag carries users private information such as
name, age, location, etc, which are meant to be protected from other sources.
Gaining the information of the tag’s attributes lead to vulnerability of the
users privacy and security.
Tag unlinkability
Tag unlinkability can be defined as a property that guarantees to secure all
linkable information of any user based on the record of his past behavior.
Tags are mostly reused by many manufacturers in which by physically tam-
pering the tag and gaining its information allows the adversary to access
the information of the previous owner. Cryptographic techniques play a
vital role in securing the private information which disallow the adversary to
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predict any of tag’s information [21].
Forward untraceability
Forward untraceability is a property where an adversary can succeed in
gaining the internal state of the tag at time τ but cannot guess or predict the
future state of the tag after time τ . Forward untraceability and Backward
untraceability are the two strong privacy notions that are proposed to ensure
forward and backward privacy in the oﬄine and online communication [33].
Robust pseudo random bit generators (PRBG) are used to ensure forward
untraceability [15]. Robust PRBG’s are rather considered stronger than the
standard PRBG’s in achieving forward and backward privacy. Standard
PRBG’s use keyed hash function in contrast to robust PRBGs [7,21].
Backward untraceability
Backward untraceability is a property where adversary can succeed in gaining
the internal state of the tag at time τ but fail to guess any of the previous
states before time τ . The adversaries execute the forward and backward
tracing with the help of the CORRUPT query.
Tag impersonation attack
Tag cloning refers to gather the identifying information of the tag to create
a duplicate tag. These tags are used purposefully in several instances where
the legitimate tag has a role to play. All the legitimate readers authenticate
these tags by confirming their fake identity. This leads to the impersonation
of an authorized user which is a severe privacy issue that has to be avoided.
The solution to this issue to implement a mutual authentication scheme that
authenticates a tag and the reader (respectively tag and the back-end server)
mutually by means of lightweight cryptographic schemes [3].
Server impersonation attack
Server impersonation attack occurs when an adversary impersonates a valid
server to a tag or a reader. In this case, desynchronize can occur where the
tag updates the data but the server does not. Hence the tag and the server
are said to be incapable of successful communication. The tag is said to
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Figure 5: Passive Eavesdropping and Active scanning
release all its stored secrets and the genuine server is still not update any
information in its DB entry.
4.2 Affects of Adversaries
Eavesdropping is a spying technique to retrieve secret information without the
permission of the legitimate party involved in the conversation. Eavesdrop-
ping can take place in any type of communication in which the exchangeable
information between the legitimate sender and the receiver is being read
anonymously. Adversary (eavesdropper) is a third party who spies on two
legitimate parties without their permission. Eavesdropping can take place in
wired, wireless communication, half and full handshake communication and
multiplexed communication. The main aim of the eavesdropper (adversary)
is to acquire partial information from all the possible channels within the
near field to acquire the remote functioning of the devices without their
consent [13].
4.2.1 Passive Eavesdropping
Passive eavesdropping is a problem of unauthorized reading of tag’s informa-
tion by illegitimate authentication through forward communication channel.
A forward channel is the channel through which the information between
reader and tag is transmitted whereas the backward channel is the channel
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through which the information between the tag and the reader is transmitted.
Passive eavesdropping takes place within the near field region. A near field
region is an area at which the tag is visible to the reader. The main aim of an
passive adversary is to acquire the EPC of the tag and gain the information
of the customer’s personal attributes and traces. This type of eavesdropping
requires a low range communication, like the adversary with the fake reader
needs to be within 10m distance of the tag to trace or scan the information.
[10].
4.2.2 Active Scanning
Active Scanning or Active eavesdropping is defined as unauthorized reading
of both the backward and forward communication channels. The main aim
of an active adversary is unauthorized access of legitimate tags and readers
and totally modify the contents of the tag and the reader behavior. It can
also be possible to manipulate the back-end server if an active adversary
successfully impersonates a tag [10].
4.3 Mutual Authentication
In an RFID system, the reader is considered as a single powerful device
and a secure participant as it evaluates information of the tag from the
server through a wired channel in most cases. On the other side, tags
are inexpensive and insecure devices which are prone to attacks and are
communicated through wireless channels. Privacy in a system makes sure
the adversary cannot link relationships of the tag based on its previous
or present information. Clearly, the purpose of RFID tag is to identify
itself just to the reader and nobody else. The primary aim of an adversary
in an RFID system to basic knowledge is to physically tamper a tag and
retrieve possible information and apply several algorithms to break the
logic of the system. The main concern of the RFID system is (i) not to
allow the tag to become corrupted and release end users information to
the third parties who later take the benefit of the private information. (ii)
not to allow a reader to become corrupted as it can expose the tag and
server information at a broader view. A malicious reader can trace the
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tag’s information and can manipulate the data in the back end server and
vice versa. Hence there is a necessity for authentication of all the three
devices (namely tag, reader and back-end server) to prove their legitimacy
[28]. Several cryptographic protocols (symmetric and asymmetric) have been
proposed to help devices in mutually authenticating each other in the RFID
system. Mutual authentication schemes are designed with the assistance of
time-stamps, pseudo-random numbers, hash functions and cryptographic
protocols. In this thesis, mutual authentication is proved using symmetric
ciphers like PRESENT, GRAIN and Humming Bird-2. The main aim of
a cipher is to randomize the state information on one end which could be
retrieved by decryption at the other end only. The main aim of the mutual
authenticating protocol is to achieve user freedom from privacy threats from
any third party. Mutual authentication helps in curbing the threats such as
tag impersonation, server impersonation, etc; [8].
4.3.1 Mutual Authentication using Cryptographic Hash-functions
Terms
Hash: hash function combines multiple strings into an unpredictable string
CRC: cyclic redundancy check
SK: shared key
MK: main key
KD: key decryption
The mutual authentication protocol proposed in [27] is a novel hash based
mutual authentication scheme executed between the tag and the reader
assuming the communication between the reader and back-end database is
secure. The hash function uses a pseudo random generator to execute the
hash process. According to the protocol, the back-end database stores the
following values for every tag Ti: (tag ID (ID), shared key (SK), the main key
(MK)). After initialization of the process, the tag and the database execute the
authentication procedure via the reader [27]. The authentication procedure
is initialized by the reader. Upon receiving a request from a reader, the tag
generates a random number N1 by using a pseudo random generator. Eventu-
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ally the tag calculates two values namely H1 and CRC1. They are defined as:
H1 = Hash(N1 || ID || SK)
CRC1 = CRC(N1 || H1)
(11)
The tag sends the values N1, H1 and CRC1 to the reader subsequently.
Upon receiving the data values (N1, H1, CRC1) from the tag, the reader
recalculates CRC ′ to verify the accuracy of the received values.
CRC
′ = CRC(N1 || H1)
(12)
If the equation CRC ′ = CRC1 tends to be correct, the reader sends the
values (N1, H1) to the back-end database. Else the reader just abandons
the authentication process. Upon receiving the values from the reader, the
back-end database checks the database if there exists an ID′ that satisfies
the following equations:
Hash(N1 || ID || KD(MK || ID′)) = Hash(N1 || ID || SK) where KD(MK ||
ID
′) = SK
(13)
In case of the above equation satisfying both sides confirms that the au-
thentication is successful. The server calculates shared key using the key
decryption function and therefore verifies the equation. The authentication
succeeds or else the process get terminated by the server. Upon a successful
completion, the server sends ID′ to check the conformity with the tag and
the reader. Upon receiving the value (ID′) from the back-end database, the
reader computes two new values:
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H2 = Hash(N1 || ID′)
CRC2 = CRC(N1 || H2)
(14)
The reader sends the values (N1, H2, CRC2) to the tag. Upon receiving
the values from the reader, the tag verifies the value of N1 whether it is
generated by itself and if not, it abandons the authentication process. Else,
it recalculates CRC ′2 and checks if it is equal to the received value CRC2. If
CRC2 6= CRC ′2, it abandons the authentication process. Else, it recalculates
H
′
2 and checks if it equal to H2. If H
′
2 6= H2, then it abandons the authenti-
cation process. The tag-to-reader authentication is completed if the above
two cases are successful. Hence the mutual authentication process is said to
be successful.
Hash functions have been producing good results in cryptographic applica-
tions. Hashes are used in several security systems where the information
is of utmost importance[19]. Cryptographic hash functions produce great
results in lenience to a comparatively high gate size relative to the symmetric
ciphers.
4.4 Symmetric Encryption based Privacy
Privacy is a basic requirement to be fulfilled when RFID tags are carried by
the users personally from place to place. These tags are supposed to be free
without any possibility of spying. Mutual authentication is a procedure which
allows systematic verification of a legitimate tag and a reader participating in
the communication by agreeing to a certain protocol. Symmetric ciphers are
strong, flexible and contain less overhead compared to the public key ciphers
in the context of lightweight cryptography. In this section, it is assumed that
the symmetric ciphers are appropriate in helping the RFID system to solve
the privacy issues.
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4.4.1 Block cipher Authentication using GCM mode
Block ciphers have a special set of operations known as "block cipher modes
of operation" that are used externally to the encryption process to provide
services such as confidentiality and authenticity. There are several block
cipher modes that are developed till today in which the general four modes
used are Electronic code book (ECB), Cipher-block-chaining mode (CBC),
Cipher feedback mode (CFB) and the output feedback mode (OFB). Sev-
eral other modes of operation are Galois Counter mode (GCM), Counter
Chainblocking mode (CCM), etc. The modes are not explained in the report
as they are not required in detail. All the block cipher modes rendezvous
with each other when used in similar contexts. In this thesis, we show the
authentication procedure of PRESENT block cipher using the GCM mode.
Terms
Pi : Plaintext of n blocks.
Ai : Additional authenticated data
IV : Initialization vector, 64 bits (known to tag, reader and the server).
S : Output string generated by encrypting both ciphertexts.
MSBT : Most significant bit of the authenticated tag T, used for authenti-
cation.
GCTR : Galois counter function
GHASH : Galois keyed hash function
The mutual authentication procedure contains three main functions namely
Present, GCTR and GHASH. Present is a block cipher which encrypts the
certain information to produce the first ciphertext. Similarly, GCTR pro-
duces the second ciphertext. Both the ciphertexts are then encrypted using
the keyed hash function GHASH to produce a temporary output. The output
obtained from the GHASH is used in producing an authentication tag. The
primary ciphertext C1 is produced by the block cipher PRESENT by encrypt-
ing the key and 64 bit 0’s as shown in the equation 4.5. While the encryption
proceeds, GCTR function is initialized parallely using initialization vector
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(IV) and the plaintext (Pi) to produce the second ciphertext block (C2) as
shown in the equation 4.5. The three variables namely ciphertext from block
cipher (C1), authenticated data (Ai) and ciphertext from GCTR (C2) are
key hashed by GHASH function to produce the temporary output S.
C1 = PRESENT(0∗, key)
C2 = GCTR(IV, P)
S = GHASH (C1, A, C2)
T = GCTR(IV, S)
(15)
The temporary output S along with the initialization vector are used by
GCTR function to generate the authentication tag T in which the most
significant bit t of the authentication tag T is used as the authentication
code. Both the ciphertext C1,C2 and T are send to the reader which inturn
forwards them to the back end server. The server decrypts the second cipher-
text and the initialisation vector by GCTR(IV, C2) to retrieve the plaintext
P. Secondly, the server calculates the authentication tag T ′ as shown in
equation 4.6 and checks if t = t′ . Once the server realises the match, the
mutual authentication is successful. In case there is no match, the server
discontinues the authentication procedure.
T = GCTR(IV, S)
t = MSBT [GCTR (IV, S)]
t
′ = MSBT [GCTR (IV, S)]
(16)
The server then calculates a new authentication bit t′ as shown in the equa-
tion 4.6 and sends it to the reader. The reader recalculates the t′ using the
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formula shown in the equation 4.6 and confirms the successful authentication
of the legitimate tag. The whole authentication process works on three key
functions which are Present, GCTR and GHASH. While the block cipher
tries to strengthen the key string by encrypting the key with an other string,
the other two functions supposedly did the routine work like encrypting the
plaintext and further protection of the resulted plaintext as shown in the
equation 4.5. The Present cipher is solely maintained to encrypt the key
with the zero string. The block cipher’s 31 round iterative process lay a
strong ground in which the adversary finds hard to break the cipher even by
using reverse engineering. The cipher which combines encrypted data with
the cipher produced by the Galois counter is a reliable effort for safeguarding
the privacy of the information.
4.4.2 Stream cipher authentication using Challenge-Response ap-
proach.
The estream ciphers like Grain, Trivium are proposed to be used for low-
constrained authentication which are the only lightweight stream ciphers
in present use today. The estream project is mainly dedicated to develop
lightweight stream ciphers for low-constrained devices for security applica-
tions. Grain and Trivium are awarded as the best among the few estream
protocols. In this subsection, we consider Grain to mutually authenticate
the devices in the RFID system.
Terms
K: key used by the tag
(Ki,Knew): key pair (current and new) stored in the key array of the server
a: random value computed by the reader
b: random value computed by the tag
c: Encryption of IV and key K computed by the tag for authentication as
challenge
d: Encryption of IV and key K computed by the reader for authentication
as response)
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Gt: Grain cipher encryption and decryption at the tag
Gr: Grain cipher encryption and decryption at the reader
Gs: Grain cipher encryption and decryption at the server
The communication is initialized by the reader as the passive tag has no
equipment to produce a signal. Grain is solely maintained to produce the
keystream which is later conjoined with the plaintext using a binary arith-
metic operation (like XOR). The reader sends a random value a to the tag.
On receiving the value a from the reader, the tag computes a random value b
and concatenates both a and b to produce the initialization vector as shown
in the equation 4.7. After computing the IV, the tag also computes a new
value c produced by Grain by encrypting IV and the key as shown in the
equation 4.7. The tag returns c to the reader. On receiving the value c from
the tag, the reader decrypts the tag using Gt(IV, K) and then searches the
value K in the key pair of the server. If the K match among the key pair of
the server, the authentication is said to be successful.
IV = a || b
c = Gt(IV,K)
d = Gr(IV,K)
(17)
The reader then computes value d using the Grain cipher by encrypting
IV and its key as shown in the equation 4.7. The reader returns the value
d to the tag. The tag decrypts the value d using the Grain cipher. After
retrieving the key the tag checks the key Ki with the key K in the tag. If
there is a match, the authentication is successful. The tag updates its new
key to Gs(K,IV).Ki is one of the key pair stored in the server. The server
keeps track of the current keys of the tag and server. The server calculates a
new key Knew after every authentication process and sends it to the tag.If
any of the tags are not matching the keypair in the server, the authentication
is cancelled.
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The strength of the stream ciphers lie on generating the keystream. Grain
being a rigorous stream cipher produces a 160 times clocked keystream. This
allows the cipher to perform despite the authentication process is simple.
The mutual authentication process being simple is not an obstacle for the
stream ciphers as they preserve the message better until the key is secure
because the encryption between the key and the plaintext is done by a simple
operation. All three devices can apply the Grain cipher function to retrieve
and send the private information in order to prove their legitimacy.
4.5 Analogy
Security and privacy are evaluated based on the amount of information the
adversary claims to be genuine. Privacy is said to be under threat if an
adversary gains non-negligible information of a legitimate tag (or reader
respectively). The main aim of the symmetric protocols is to let the RFID
system to run and control the devices and maintain anonymity, untraceabil-
ity, forward and backward privacy, tag and server impersonation [6]. Hash
functions are mostly used to conserve a whole file as it encrypts the given file
name or number into a hash value which is hard to predict. Cryptographic
hash functions are used in many security applications for authentication
as they are practically hard to break. Tags contain permanent identifiers
and some tags are re-writable as well. Tag anonymity and untraceability
are conserved by hash functions rather than the symmetric ciphers in case
of re-writable tags as the cipher functions are combined with the mutual
authentication functions and work online. Hash functions carry the tag
identifiers along with the message and the hashes are hard to break as no two
hashes are the same. The symmetric ciphers are not bounded to safeguard
the information of the tag identifiers oﬄine as physically tampering the tags
do violate the authentication protocol. The ciphers can safeguard the tag’s
identity if and only if the tag works online and in passive mode.
Hash functions provide a better unlinkability than compared to the sym-
metric ciphers as the hashes carry all the folder information as a single
message and no two hashes are the same to predict. Symmetric ciphers can
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key size block size gate size
Hash function - 128 7000
Present(block cipher) 80 bits 64 bits 1500
Grain (stream cipher) 64 bits 1 bit 1200
Table 6: Attributes of the protocols
guarantee the anonymity only if the channel is secure because the adversary
can physically tamper the tag and get the previous owner information of the
tag which is unethical. The ciphers guarantee that no malicious reader can
act as the original one as the symmetric authentication using the ciphers
are hard to predict as they need to correspond to the challenge response
approach. Forward untraceability is a situation that has to be safeguarded
after the state had been predicted and therefore do not let the adversary
gain any future state based on the obtained information. Hash functions
need large hardware because of their complex algorithms and their gate
equivalent is approximately around 7000 gates. When the adversary gains
the internal state of the cipher by tampering the tag or randomly responding
to the reader can only be allowed to contain or maintain the state for that
particular instance while the challenge from the reader comes into play, the
illegitimate tag cannot predict the key and other attributes of the authen-
tication process to complete the mutual authentication process. The block
cipher having 31 rounds of added round key iterative process consumes lot
of time for the adversary to gain the key and respond to the reader instantly.
Hence it is not possible for the adversary to gain the future state of the cipher.
Grain being a stream cipher plays a prominent role in the challenge response
authentication scheme as it encrypts the key and the initialization vector to
produce the secondary cipher which is encrypted along with the message bit
to produce the primary cipher. Grain having a mixed linearity feature as it
uses both linear and non-linear feedback registers produce a vigorous random
cipher which is hard to predict even the current state is revealed. Therefore
the symmetric ciphers always hold the adversary in gaining the future state
with the help of the authentication scheme. In terms of backward untraceabil-
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Hash function PRESENT GRAIN
Tag anonymity G G G
Tag Unlinkability G G G
Forward Untraceability PG G G
Backward Untraceability PG PG PG
Tag Impersonation attacks PG PG PG
Server Impersonation attacks PG G G
Table 7: Properties for privacy preservation, G - Guaranteed, PG - Partially
guaranteed, NG- Not guaranteed
ity, physically tampering the tag and gain the internal state of the cipher and
predicting the previous cipher and the key is possible as the adversary has
enough time to draw it. Hence the backward privacy is partially guaranteed
given that the physical tampering of the tag is a possibility. Controlling
the reader using an illegitimate tag is one way the adversary approach to
the RFID system to retain the key for the later stage but it seems neither
the symmetric ciphers nor the hash function does allow the adversary to
totally gain the key and the only possibility at that moment is to gain hold
of the reader for a single transaction where the identifiers in the tag and the
server are different and are found out in the later transaction. The ultimate
aim of an adversary in impersonating a tag is to gain little information of
the tag from the reader (or the server respectively). The accomplishment
of obtaining information in a single transaction cannot help the adversary
completely as the reader comes into contact with the server at some point
(challenge response time out). Similarly the adversary tries alternatively by
impersonating the server (or the reader respectively) but the legitimate tag
can contact the reader (or the server respectively) but awaits to the response
from the server where the adversary fails in synchronization on the wired
channel between the reader and the server. As the database details do not
match after a timeout occurs, either of the reader and the server process
discontinues due to the termination of the authentication procedure.This
shows that the adversary cannot prevail in the current scenario even if he
succeeds to entertain either of the reader or the server with little key input
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information (or by using a malicious device). Symmetric lightweight ciphers
save time in recognizing the threat to the RFID device from an adversary in
compared to the hash functions as hashes need more hardware and processing
for maintain and run the cyclic redundancy check method (CRC) at every end.
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5 Conclusion
Today RFID systems have reached several destinations from a wired-home
application to a retail supply chain management systems. As the RFID
technology provides cheap source of maintenance, there is a rapid increase in
its utilization and hence new security challenges had arose for the design-
ers as well as the consumers. Cryptographic tools such as hash functions
and symmetric ciphers are developed for the RFID systems to secure its
environment from the third party interference and spying of the potential
information that are exchanged. Cryptographic research community had
undergone several challenges to conserve the security and privacy of the
end-users and some are yet to be achieved. Lightweight cryptography was a
new development and approach tool for the real security applications which
has been proven reasonably an efficient solution in privacy for the end users.
Several privacy models that are proposed by Avoine[11] and Juels, Weis [12]
are the best methods till date but are practically hard to implement on the
low-constrained platform. In this thesis, the importance of the lightweight
protocols has been analysed to greater limits while preserving privacy and
security of the RFID system using mutual authentication schemes such as
challenge-response scheme and GCM mode scheme.
The hard reconciling issues like anonymity, untraceabilty and imperson-
ation of RFID devices are safeguarded by the authentication schemes while
the data is preserved by the symmetric ciphers. With the large use of RFID
tags everywhere, especially the low cost tags demanded the need for sym-
metric ciphers and hardware efficient hash functions. The symmetric ciphers
are selected and organized based on the circuit size or the gate size which
are considered optimal around 2000-3000 gates or less, passive devices not
consuming much energy (which limits the range of the device). The use of the
initialization vector (IV) allows rapid re-initialization of the cipher without
re-keying the cipher. The IV’s are not repeated when used in the GCM mode
as the cipher becomes insecure as counter functions are applied more than
once using the same IV. The authentication schemes provide an organization
for the devices that lays the foundation for a secure communication with a
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mutual agreement of providing genuine information using challenge response
behavior and avoiding the third party interference.
The primitive use of symmetric ciphers like block ciphers in the construc-
tion of the hash functions started when the well known block cipher DES
(Data encryption standard) was developed. The introduction to lightweight
cryptography had separated the two protocols (symmetric ciphers and hash
functions) as the cipher size and hardware size had to be reduced in order
to prevail in the low cost arena. The new style of compact hashing using
64 bit and 128 bit hash outputs had driven the hash functions into the
lightweight cryptography. The hashes have proven themselves as a strong
model of cryptography as they use much larger range than other ciphers
in the encryption but at the same time they consume large hardware area.
The range of the hardware requirements is directly proportional to cost
effectiveness and it is left to the application that demand the requirements.
The main design goal of a cipher is to reduce the total number of logic
gates required to materialize the cipher. This metric is called Gate Equiva-
lent (GE).A small GE predisposes that the circuit is cheap and consumes less
power. An optimum circuit to protect and maintain efficiency is 1000-3000GE
because passive tags run on the host power.. Other design goals are memory,
processing power, throughput and power savings.
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